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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an interlocutory appeal of an order of the Second Judicial District Court in 
a civil case. This Court's jurisdiction is based upon Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2-
2(3)0). 
RELEVANT STATUTES AND RULES 
Defendant cites as the relevant statute Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30d-502. 
That citation is not correct. Mrs. Carter died in 2003. Section 63-30d-502 did not take 
effect until July 1, 2004. Therefore, the relevant statute is Section 63-30-17 although in 
this case the language is the same. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 63-30-17: 
Actions against the state may be brought in the county in which the 
claim arose or in Salt Lake County. Actions against a county may be brought 
in the county in which the claim arose, or in the defendant county, or, upon 
leave granted by a district court judge of the defendant county, in any county 
contiguous to the defendant county. Leave may be granted ex parte. Actions 
against all other political subdivisions including cities and towns, shall be 
brought in the county in which the political subdivision is located or in the 
county in which the claim arose. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 78-13-7: 
In all other cases the action must be tried in the county in which the 
cause of action arises, or in the county in which any defendant resides at the 
commencement of the action; provided, that if any such defendant is a 
corporation, any county in which such corporation has its principal office or 
place of business shall be deemed the county in which such corporation resides 
within the meaning of this section. If none of the defendants resides in this 
state, such action may be commenced and tried in any county which the 
plaintiff may designate in his complaint; and if the defendant is about to depart 
from the state, such action may be tried in any county where any of the parties 
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resides or service is had, subject, however, to the power of the court to change 
the place of trial as provided by law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. In November, 2002, Mrs. Carter underwent hip revision surgery at the 
University of Utah Medical Center. Thereafter, she was released to the Manorcare 
Nursing Home in Ogden where she had a fall in late December, 2002. That fall damaged 
her newly revised hip and began a series of treatments and operations at the University of 
Utah Medical Center. 
2. A lawsuit has been filed against Manorcare alleging its negligence relating 
to the fall. That claim has now been consolidated with plaintiffs claims against the 
University of Utah Medical Center and the Crestwood Care Center. 
3. Between January 30, 2003 and February 15, 2003 when Mrs. Carter was 
diagnosed with a MRSA (Methicillin Resistant Staph Aureus) staph infection, which 
contributed to or lead to her death, Mrs. Carter received medical treatment at both the 
University of Utah Medical Center and the Crestwood Care Center. 
4. A MRSA staph infection is primarily regarded as a nosocomial infection, 
meaning in this instance a staph infection acquired in a hospital or nursing care setting 
due to improper sterile techniques or practices. 
5. The incubation period for the MRSA infection, diagnosed in Mrs. Carter on 
February 15, 2003, is consistent with her medical treatment stays at the University of 
Utah Medical Center and/or the Crestwood Care Center. 
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6. During the critical periods of time for incubation of the MRS A staph 
infection, Mrs. Carter was in the University of Utah Medical Center or the Crestwood 
Care Center. So, to a high degree of probability, she contracted her infection in one 
facility or the other. 
7. Defendants Crestwood Care Center and Manorcare Care Center are both 
located in Ogden, Utah. Any claims against each arose in Weber County, these 
defendants have their principal places of business in Weber County, and venue is, 
therefore, proper against both in Weber County. 
8. Mrs. Carter's fall, her medical treatment, operations, hospital and nursing 
home care are interrelated events leading to her death in August, 2003. One trial is the 
proper and efficient way to resolve this case. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Section 63-30-17, Utah Code Annotated simply does not speak to the issue of 
venue when there are multiple defendants including the state causing or contributing to an 
injury, death or other claim. The only statutory venue provision which specifically 
addresses multiple defendant situations is Section 78-13-7 which places proper venue in 
the county in which any defendant resides. 
A review of the Utah Legislature's enactment and passage of Senate Bill 4, 1965 
which created the governmental immunity act Section 63-30-1 et seq., Utah Code 
Annotated, and contained what became Section 63-30-17 reveals nothing to indicate that 
3 
the Legislature ever discussed venue in multi-defendant cases or that it intended Section 
63-30-17 to supplant Section 78-13-7 in multi-defendant cases. 
Public policy reasons do not support the notion that it is an extraordinary or 
unusual burden for the University or other agency of state government to have to defend 
multi-defendant cases in a county other than Salt Lake County. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. NOTHING IN THE ENACTMENT OF SENATE BILL 4, 
1965 WHICH BECAME THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY 
ACT LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE LEGISLATURE 
INTENDED TO LIMIT VENUE AGAINST THE STATE IN MULTI-
DEFENDANT SITUATIONS TO SALT LAKE COUNTY. 
The Utah Government Immunity Act was enacted by the Legislature in 1965 to 
become effective on July 15 1966. What became the Governmental Immunity Act 
originated as Senate Bill 4 in 1965. The Senate Judiciary Committee notes no longer 
exist but the conceptual basis for the legislation is set forth in the Senate Judiciary 
Committee report dated January 14, 1965. 
January 14, 1965 
Mr. President: 
Your Committee on the Judiciary to which was 
referred S.B. No. 4, by Messrs. Welch and M. Jenkins, has 
carefully considered said bill and reports the same act 
favorably for the following reasons: 
1. It is the opinion of the Judiciary Committee that 
the ancient doctrine of governmental immunity based on the 
concept that the king can do no wrong should be basically 
modified in modern society. 
2. Said act serves to allow the citizens of the State 
of Utah equitable remedy in the Courts where they have been 
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damaged. 
3. Said act empowers government units to 
protect themselves by the purchase of insurance. 
4. The passage of said act is in the best 
interests of the citizenship of this State. 
Respectfully 
Oscar W. McConkie, Jr. 
Chairman 
Senate Journal, Utah 1965, p. 101 
Legislators wanted citizens of this state to have some method of redress against the state 
for injury claims and authorized the state to protect itself by purchasing insurance. 
In none of the audio tape discussions about the bill is there any indication that the 
Legislature intended to supplant Section 78-13-7 by making Salt Lake County the 
exclusive venue in multi-defendant cases where one defendant is the state or an arm of 
the state and other necessary defendants reside or acted outside Salt Lake County. 
Further, nothing in the governmental immunity act itself indicates any regard for or 
consideration about the multi-defendant situation. 
This was precisely the situation that the Michigan Court of Appeals faced in the 
case of Hoffman v. Bos, 224 N.W.2d 107 (Mich App.). Plaintiff had been injured in a 
motorcycle accident. She brought suit against Bos the operator of the motorcycle, Honda 
Motor Co. and the road commission of Barry County, Michigan in the Kent County 
Circuit Court. Michigan had a general venue statute which addressed multiple defendant 
situations and a statute which said substantively that you must sue a governmental unit in 
the county where it exercises its governmental authority but which did not address a 
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multi-defendant situation. Barry County therefore moved for a change of venue out of 
Kent County and to Barry County arguing it could only be sued in the Barry County 
Circuit Court. 
In that situation, the Michigan Court of Appeals recognized that standard rules of 
statutory construction are not persuasive in resolving the conflict because such rules of 
construction lead to opposite results - i.e. one can argue persuasively that by not 
mentioning or referring to multi-defendant cases in the county government venue statute 
the legislature intended to keep intact the existing statute which does refer to multi-
defendant venue or that by enacting a county government venue statute that the legislature 
intended to mandate only one venue. 
The Court also recognized that the same public policy arguments raised by the 
University of Utah Medical Center - - the added cost and inconvenience of requiring 
governmental units to defend themselves in distant counties are offset by the strong 
public policy reasons justifying trying all grievances in a single suit especially in this 
modern day when dockets are crowded and with "the development of modern 
communication and ease of transportation" the significance of the added cost and 
inconvenience argument has diminished in substance. 
Ultimately, the Michigan Court of Appeals came down on the practical side of 
recognizing that the minority of cases involving governmental entities are multi-
defendant cases. Therefore, in those situations venue would lie in any appropriate county 
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where a defendant resides or the cause of action arose. And, in the majority of cases 
exclusively against a governmental unit suit must be brought in the county where the 
governmental unit exercises its authority. In substance, the court harmonized the 
language of both sections by permitting each section to do exactly what its language 
specified without deeming an additional, but unspecified intent into the governmental 
venue statute. 
POINT II. TO RULE THAT SALT LAKE COUNTY IS THE 
EXCLUSIVE VENUE FOR SUITS INVOLVING THE STATE, 
WITHOUT EXCEPTION, CREATES AN INHERENT CONFLICT IN 
THE VENUE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 63-30-17 AND SECTION 63-
30d-502. 
Section 63-30-17 and now 63-30d-502 both contain language that says actions 
against the State may be brought in the county in which the claim arose or in Salt Lake 
County; claims against counties may be brought against a county in which the claim arose 
or in the defendant county or a contiguous county; but actions against ah other political 
subdivisions including cities and towns "shall be" brought in the county in which the 
political subdivision is located or in the county in which the claim arose. 
In our modern world, the conflict this language creates if the University of Utah 
Medical Center's exclusive venue argument is accepted is obvious. Recently, a Nevada 
police officer was speeding, collided with four people from Utah and killed them. 
Change the location of that accident to Ogden City and the statutory conflict jumps out. 
An Ogden City policeman, without justification is speeding and collides with a car 
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carrying four Ogden City residents. They are severely injured and life-flighted to the 
University of Utah Medical Center. There one of the injured people is given a blood 
thinner but the drug isn't properly monitored and the injured person bleeds to death. 
Claims for the injuries and death therefore lie against Ogden City for the actions of its 
officer and against the University of Utah Medical Center for medical negligence. The 
claims should logically and necessarily be tried in one lawsuit. 
However, if the University's interpretation of Sections 63-30-17 and 63-30d-502 is 
accepted, without exception, either you must force the claim against Ogden City to be 
tried in Salt Lake County, which explicitly violates the mandatary statutory language or 
you must separate the claims entirely and try two different cases in two different counties 
on the same set of operative circumstances which makes no sense in time or money to the 
court system or the parties. 
The simple and obvious way to avoid this circumstance is to follow the venue 
language of Sections 63-30-17 and 63-30d-502 when a governmental unit is the sole 
defendant, consistent with the explicit language of those sections, and to follow the venue 
language of Section 78-13-7 in multi-defendant situations otherwise you force a "chaotic 
multiplicity of litigation" Lawless v. Village of Park Forest South, 438 N.E.2d 1299 (111 
App. 1982). Such a ruling harmonizes the explicit language of both statutory provisions. 
In the Lawless case, plaintiff brought suit for trespass to land against multiple 
cities and city officials. Illinois had a government venue statute which said "Actions must 
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be brought against...a...municipal...corporation in the county in which its principal office 
is located." Therefore, all the separate defendants moved to force the transfer of the case 
to their respective home counties. The Court of Appeals observed: "The result would be 
division of this case into multiple cases." The court evaluated the ramifications of the 
defendants' arguments and said "acceptance of defendants' interpretation of section 2-
103(a) would create judicial chaos. In this case, application of defendants' theory would 
lead to two separate cases. Situations can easily be postulated in which far more than two 
separate cases would have to be created." 
The Court rejected defendants' theory saying that in cases involving multiple 
governmental units insisting on venue in their own county must yield to having the case 
tried in one proceeding regardless of the statutory language. 
Interestingly, the Lawless court in its 1982 decision cited to cases in the State of 
Florida which had accepted the argument that you must separate the case into multiple 
cases and criticized that procedure. Then, in 1983, the Florida Supreme Court in the case 
of Board of County Commissioners of Madison County v. Grice, 483 So.2d 392 (1983) 
citing Lawless reversed prior decisions and recognized that the home venue privilege for 
government entities is not absolute but must yield to a single proceeding when a 
governmental body is sued as a joint tortfeasor. 
The same reasoning applies with equal force in the case at issue. Accepting the 
defendant's position would force this same case to be tried twice in two separate counties 
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at a cost of twice the time and twice the expense. Certainly our legislature never intended 
such a result. 
POINT III. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS SUPPORT AN 
ENTIRE CASE BEING TRIED IN ONE PROCEEDING AND 
CONCERNS OF UNDUE CONVENIENCE NO LONGER PREVAIL IN 
OUR MODERN SOCIETY. 
Defendant contends it is unduly burdensome for it to be sued outside Salt Lake 
County. An examination of defendant's website shows it currently operates clinics in 
Davis, Utah, Tooele and Salt Lake Counties and conducts outreach programs in schools 
and on Indian reservations throughout the State. Clearly, this particular defendant can 
reasonably anticipate being sued in any county in the State. On its face the inconvenience 
and overly burdensome argument fails. 
However, the cases of Lawless v. Village of Park Forest South; Board of County 
Commissioners of Madison County v. Grice; Hoffman v. Bos; and Peaceman v. Cades, 
416 A.2d 1042 (Pa. Super. 1980) (superceded by statutory amendment) uniformly 
recognized that governmental officers are, in this modern age of communication and 
travel, no different from any other citizens who may be forced to travel in order to defend 
lawsuits in counties other than where they reside. The burden to the University of 
defending a claim in Weber County, when it already operates a clinic in Davis County, 
and outreach programs statewide, presumptively including Weber County, seems very 
slight, indeed if any burden at all. 
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Defendant cites only to the case of Abshire v. State of Louisiana, 636 So.2d 627, a 
1994 decision by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals for the State of Louisiana bucking 
the above trend which ruled that state officials could only be sued when their ministerial 
actions were being called into question in Baton Rouge, the State capitol. That holding 
was based upon unique statutory language in Louisiana and was in conflict with other 
decisions by other state circuit courts of appeal in Louisiana. It is a distinguishable case. 
CONCLUSION 
Section 63-30-17 simply does not address multi-defendant cases and there is no 
legislative history suggesting that it was intended to do so. Section 78-13-7, however, 
does and is, in fact, the only venue statute which does specifically address multi-
defendant cases. The court should rule that when the state defendant is the sole defendant 
and the claim did not arise elsewhere Salt Lake County is the exclusive venue consistent 
with Sections 63-30-17 and 63-30d-502. However, when there are multiple defendants, 
one of whom is the state, Section 78-13-7 is the controlling provision. 
DATED this ^7 day oi/^^d^L^ , 2006. 
^ ^ 
MES R. HASENYAGER 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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